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Abstract
It is well known that womens career outcomes are tied to fertility decisions and that
occasionally educated women who had planned to stay in the labor market after childbirth
exit the market. We examine womens career, fertility, and educational choices in an en-
vironment of uncertainty regarding the possibility of achieving both a high-powered career
and a family. In a simple framework, we show that although women may prefer to have
both a prestigious career and a family they may choose a less prestigious job or no family
due to the uncertainty involved in being able to achieve both a career and family. In an
overlapping generations model, we examine how womens beliefs about the probability of
a career separation due to family obligations are formulated and show that a simple belief
updating structure exists in which future generations beliefs may converge and certainly
do not diverge from the true probability of a career separation. Lastly, we examine the
impact of grandparent child care networks on career and family choices in both a static and
overlapping generations model.
JEL Classication: J00, D80, C70
Keywords: Career Separation, Child Care, Uncertainty, Updating Beliefs, Grandparent
Networks
1 Introduction
It is well documented that women often exit the labor market due to family obligations such
as child care; see for instance Goldin (2006). In fact, Boushey (2005) found that although
highly educated women were more likely to stay in the labor force than less educated women,
of those highly educated women not in the labor force, 87 percent had a child at home.
Additionally, although most women with children are employed (see Boushey (2005)), they
are traditionally less likely to have a "career"1 than are women without children (see Goldin
(1997) and Blau (1998)), and educated women are less likely to achieve a goal of having both
a career and a family than are educated men (see Goldin (1997 and 2004), Perna (2004),
and Blau (1998)). Thus, it is clear that some educated women exit the labor force once
they have children, while other women choose either not to pursue high-powered careers or
not to have children. There have been many studies of the impact of a long labor force
separation on womens wages.2 Instead, we focus here on the impact of some educated
women exiting the labor force due to child care on womens child bearing decisions, career
decisions, and educational achievements, in an environment of uncertainty regarding the
possibility of achieving both a career and family.
Specically, we assume all women desire to have both a career and family, where we
dene a career to be a prestigious job requiring an educational investment and a family (as in
Goldin (2004)) to mean having at least one child. In our model, women rst decide whether
or not to invest in education where investment secures them a prestigious career which is
not always compatible with having a family while non-investment in education secures them
a less prestigious but more exible job which is always compatible with having a family.
Second, a woman chooses whether or not to have a child, where if a woman has a prestigious
1Goldin (2004) denes having a career as having an income for at least two years of at least the amount
that the bottom 25th percent of college educated men receive.
2For instance, Ruhm (1998), Francesconi (2002), and Phipps, Burton, and Lethbridge (2001) all show
that a long job force separation signicantly increases the gender wage gap. While Wood, Corcoran, Courant
(1993) and Filipppin and Ichino (2005) show that for highly educated women, a decrease in labor supply
signicantly lowers womens future wages.
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career, then there is a positive probability that having a child will cause her to exit the
labor force. In this simple framework, we show that although a woman may prefer to have
a high-powered career with a family, a woman may choose a high powered career with no
family or a family with a less prestigious job because of the uncertainty involved in being
able to obtain both a career and family.
We also examine what happens in terms of career and family decisions if the uncer-
tainty regarding the possibility of achieving both a career and family is overestimated or
underestimated. If women overestimate the probability that having a family will cause a
high-powered career loss, then women will be too cautious in their decisions and will choose
less prestigious jobs or no children when in fact it may be optimal for them to choose pres-
tigious jobs with families. If women underestimate this probability and are thus overly
optimistic in their beliefs, then they will choose prestigious careers with families when in
fact the optimal choice may be either less prestigious jobs or no families.
Given the importance of overestimating and underestimating the uncertainty of being
able to achieve both a career and family, we ask how such beliefs regarding this uncertainty
are formulated. Initially, women do not know the probability of a family causing a career
separation3, but attempt to learn this probability in an overlapping generations framework.
A woman inherits the beliefs of her mother, but is also able to observe the job and family
outcomes of the previous generation. We then ask if there is a simple rule for updating
beliefs such that beliefs either converge to the true probability of a career loss or at least
do not diverge from the true probability. We show that such a simple rule exists, where if
a woman observes either direct evidence that a member of the previous generation had no
career separation (or achieved having both a career and family) or had a career separation,
then she updates the beliefs of her mother, but if no such evidence exists then beliefs are not
updated. We show that with this simple rule initial beliefs never diverge further from the true
probability of a career loss, but given certain initial conditions beliefs can become stuck at an
3For simplicity, this probability is assumed to be the same for all women across all generations.
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incorrect probability. Our rule for updating beliefs is simple and fairly naive and has a avor
of other simple updating rules used in di¤erent contexts. For instance, Ellison and Fudenberg
(1993 and 1995) consider naive updating rules in the context of technology adoption with
word of mouth communication4, and Börgers and Sarin (1997) consider somewhat naive
updating rules where players use only a limited amount of information in a stochastic learning
context.
Lastly, we examine the impact of family child care networks on career and family
choices. Grandparents provide a considerable amount of child care to grandchildren in the
U.S. which has in fact increased in recent years. According to the U.S. Census, 18.6%
of preschoolers of employed mothers were primarily cared for by grandparents while their
mothers worked in 2002, while in 1991 this percentage was only 15.8%; see Johnson (2005).
Additionally, Fuller-Thomson and Minkler (2001) found that 40% of grandparents had pro-
vided some child care in the last month using National Survey of Families an Households
data collected in the 1990s.5
We model grandparent child care as a family network where a grandmother who does
not have a prestigious career can provide grandchild care enabling her daughter to keep a
prestigious career regardless of her family status. A grandmother with a prestigious career
cannot help with grandchild care, but is able to provide nancial assistance to her daughter
which lowers the cost of education for the daughter. In a static framework, we nd that
if a grandmother has a less prestigious job, then her daughter will always choose to have
a family. While if a grandmother has a prestigious career, then her daughter may choose
di¤erent job and family combinations depending on the cost of education and the amount
of nancial help a grandmother provides as well as, preferences, and the daughters beliefs
regarding the probability of a career separation due to child care.
4For a slightly more sophisticated updating rule in this context, see Banerjee and Fudenberg (2004).
5See also Lei (2006) and Cardia and Ng (2003) who examine the impact of grandparents helping their
children either nancially or with grandchild care on the likelihood of a child receiving such help and on the
decision to subsidize child care, respectively.
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We then consider an overlapping generations model and ask how family networks inu-
ence the career and family choices of a womans descendants. In particular, we are interested
in whether or not the choices of a womans descendants converge over time. Propositions
5, 6, and 7 give conditions under which career and family choices converge to the less pres-
tigious job with a family, the prestigious job with a family, and the prestigious job with no
family, respectively. Finally, Proposition 8 shows that if the cost of education is low and if
the probability of a family induced career separation is high, then career and family choices
may cycle from generation to generation between the prestigious job with a family and the
less prestigious job with a family.
Perhaps the most closely related paper to the current one is Breen and García-
Peñalosa (2002) who analyze why gender job segregation occurs in a Bayesian learning
framework. As in our model, there are two types of jobs one conducive to child care and
one not, but unlike our model agents are uncertain of their success in the prestigious job. If
an agent chooses a prestigious job he (respectively, she) can update his (her) beliefs after he
(she) succeeds or not and passes these beliefs on to his (her) son (respectively, daughter). It
is shown that if men and women have di¤erent initial preferences, then men and women in
future generations can end up with di¤erent beliefs which can cause gender job segregation.
Although both the current paper and Breen and García-Peñalosa (2002) analyze whether or
not beliefs in future generations converge to true beliefs, the applications are quite di¤erent
as well as the model structure. For instance, in Breen and García-Peñalosa (2002) agents
have di¤erent abilities and thus cannot learn from observing others while here information
regarding the probability of a career loss can be learned from observing others.
As womens job outcomes are often tied to fertility decisions we allow both job and
fertility decisions to be endogenous in an uncertain environment. There are other papers
which also examine womens outcomes with multiple endogenous decision variables. These
papers include Caucutt, Guner, and Knowles (2002), Dessy and Djebbari (2005), and Sheran
(2007), who examine the impact of endogenous marriage and fertility decisions on job and
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family outcomes. While Erosa, Fuster, and Restuccia (2002) investigate how fertility and
job switching decisions a¤ect wages. Additionally, Erosa, Fuster, and Restuccia (2005)
examine the impact of fertility and labor market decisions on wages in an environment with
and without mandatory maternity leaves.
The paper proceeds as follows. In sections 2 and 3 the model and basic results are
presented. The formulation of beliefs is examined in section 4, family networks are examined
in section 5, and concluding remarks are presented in section 6.
2 Model
There are n agents with N = f1; 2; :::; i; :::; ng. Each agent lives for two periods. There
are three possible job outcomes j 2 fA;B; 0g. The rst are A jobs which are high skilled
and involve educational investment, I. These jobs involve long hours, travel, and are
prestigious. The second type are B jobs which are less skilled and involve educational
investment I 0 = 0 < I; these jobs are 40 hours a week or less and involve no travel.6 Lastly,
if an agent has no job, then j = 0.
Each agent i receives utility from both her job and from her children. Utility is
represented by ui(j; c)   k where c 2 f0; 1g represents having a child or not, and k 2
f0; Ig represents is educational investment. We assume that preferences have the following
properties for all i 2 N :
(i) ui(A; c) > ui(B; c) > ui(0; c) for all c 2 f0; 1g, and
(ii) ui(j; 1) > ui(j; 0) for all j 2 fA;B; 0g.
Additionally, we dene person i to be a career type if ui(B; 1) < ui(A; 0) and we dene
i to be a child type if ui(B; 1) > ui(A; 0). We assume that each person is either a career or
child type. (Thus ui(B; 1) = ui(A; 0) is not allowed.)
6The creation of two jobs one of which is conducive to childcare and the other of which is not, is similar
to assumptions made in Breen and García-Peñalosa (2002).
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There are two types of children an agent can have: a high maintenance child or a
low maintenance child. A high maintenance child requires more care. Anyone having a
high maintenance child can still perform a B job, but is unable to perform an A job and
must quit and become unemployed. (We assume that B employers prefer to hire young
employees and will not hire someone who has left a previous job for an extended child care
leave; thus someone who leaves an A job cannot obtain a B job later.)7 Anyone having a
low maintenance child can perform in either type of job.8
Each agent i lives two periods. In the rst period, agents are born and at the end
of the rst period an agent decides to invest in the education required for an A job or not.
At the beginning of the second period, the agent starts either the A job (if she invested
in education) or the B job and then decides whether or not to have a child. If an agent
decides to have a child, with probability 0  p  1 she has a low maintenance child and
with probability 1  p she has a high maintenance child. At the end of the second period,
an agent receives utility ui(j; c)  k, where j represents the agents job at the end of period
2. Thus, if person i chooses an A job and to have a child, then his a priori expected utility
is pui(A; 1) + (1  p)ui(0; 1)  I. If i chooses an A job and no child, his expected utility
is ui(A; 0)  I. If person i chooses a B job, then having a child never a¤ects whether or not
i can keep a job. Thus, given the assumptions on preferences it is always better to have a
child and is expected utility is ui(B; 1).
7Alternatively, one could assume that mothers are less likely to be hired, as was found to be true in the
recent study of Correll, Bernard, and Paik (2007), or that women who exit the labor force receive signicantly
lower wages on re-entry (see Ruhm (1998) and Phipps, Burton, Lethbridge (2001)) making it less appealing
for them to re-enter.
8Instead, one could assume that all children are identical, but that mothers have di¤erent preferences
regarding child care which they do not learn until after childbirth. Thus, women with "high maintenance"
children can be interpreted as women who are uncomfortable leaving a child in daycare (or some other non-
family child care arrangement) for long periods of time (which is necessary if a woman has an A job). While
women with "low maintenance" children can be interpreted as those more comfortable with this arrangement.
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3 Results
Next we examine an individuals job choice and decision of whether or not to have a child.
To achieve this goal, we solve the model backwards by rst looking at the decision of whether
or not to have a child given that the person already has a job. Then we look at the decision
of which job the person will choose.
Proposition 1 (i) If ui(A; 0) > pui(A; 1) + (1   p)ui(0; 1) and i is a child type, then i
always chooses job B and chooses to have a child. If instead i is a career type, then i
chooses the A job and no child if ui(A; 0)  I > ui(B; 1) and i chooses the B job with a child
if ui(A; 0)   I < ui(B; 1). (ii) If ui(A; 0) < pui(A; 1) + (1   p)ui(0; 1), then regardless of
is type i chooses the A job with a child if pui(A; 1) + (1  p)ui(0; 1)  I > ui(B; 1), while i
chooses the B job with a child if pui(A; 1) + (1  p)ui(0; 1)  I < ui(B; 1).
Notice that in case (ii) of Proposition 1 if I = 0, then the career type always chooses
the A job with a child since ui(B; 1) < ui(A; 0) < pui(A; 1) + (1  p)ui(0; 1).
Proof. Solving the model backwards, we start in period 2. Person i already has a job, but
must choose c 2 f0; 1g. If i has an A job, then i will choose c = 0 if the payo¤ is higher or
if ui(A; 0)  I > pui(A; 1) + (1  p)ui(0; 1)  I. Person i will choose c = 1 if this inequality
is reversed. As discussed previously, if i has a B job, then i always chooses c = 1.
Next we look at is period 1 decision to choose the A or B job. First, assume
ui(A; 0) > pui(A; 1) + (1  p)ui(0; 1) or that if i has an A job, then i chooses c = 0. Person
i chooses the A job over the B job if is utility is higher or if ui(A; 0)   I > ui(B; 1). If
ui(A; 0)   I < ui(B; 1), then i chooses the B job; note that this inequality is always true
if i is a child type. Second, assume ui(A; 0) < pui(A; 1) + (1   p)ui(0; 1) or that if i has
an A job, i chooses c = 1. Person i chooses the A job if it yields a higher utility or if
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pui(A; 1) + (1  p)ui(0; 1)  I > ui(B; 1), while i chooses the B job if the reverse inequality
is true.
Next we look at the two extreme cases of p = 0 and p = 1. If p = 0, then no person
can keep the A job if she has a child.
Corollary 1 Let p = 0. If i is the child type, then i always chooses the B job with a child.
If i is the career type, then i chooses the A job with no child if ui(A; 0)  I > ui(B; 1), and
i chooses the B job with a child if ui(A; 0)  I < ui(B; 1).
The results for the child type follow from Proposition 1 and the fact that in case (ii)
of Proposition 1 pui(A; 1) + (1   p)ui(0; 1)   I = ui(0; 1)   I which is always smaller than
ui(B; 1). The results for the career type follow from Proposition 1 and the assumption that
ui(A; 0) > ui(B; 1) > ui(0; 1) = pui(A; 1) + (1  p)ui(0; 1).
If p = 1, then a person can always keep the A job regardless of her child bearing
decision. Such a person will only take the B job if the educational investment in the A job
is high.
Corollary 2 Let p = 1. Regardless of is type, i chooses the A job with a child if ui(A; 1) 
I > ui(B; 1), and i chooses the B job with a child if ui(A; 1)  I < ui(B; 1).
Corollary 2 follows from case (ii) of Proposition 1, since p = 1 and the assumption
that ui(A; 0) < ui(A; 1) excludes the possibility of case (i).
Notice that the uncertainty regarding the type of child a person will have causes
various types of ex-post mistakes. For instance, if an agent chooses the A job with a child,
then (1   p) percent of the time she ends up with no job instead. If an agent chooses the
B job with a child, then p percent of the time the person could have had the A job with a
child which is preferred if ui(A; 1)   I > ui(B; 1). If a career type chooses the A job and
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no child, then p percent of the time she could have chosen the A job with a child and been
better o¤.
Next we consider what happens if players misestimate p or make an a priori mistake.
Let player is estimate of p be epi. If epi < (>)p, then agent i thinks the probability of having
a low maintenance child is smaller (respectively, larger) than it actually is. Corollaries 3 and
4 show how such a misestimate of p can cause a player to behave either too conservatively
(in the case of underestimating p) or too boldly (in the case of overestimating p).
Corollary 3 Assume epi < p for i 2 N . (i) If epiui(A; 1) + (1  epi)ui(0; 1) < ui(A; 0) <
ui(B; 1)+I < pui(A; 1)+(1 p)ui(0; 1), then i chooses the B job with a child no matter what
is type is. If is beliefs had been correct, then i would have chosen the A job with a child.
(ii) If max fui(B; 1)+I; epiui(A; 1)+(1  epi)ui(0; 1)g < ui(A; 0) < pui(A; 1)+(1 p)ui(0; 1)
and if i is a career type, then i chooses the A job with no child. If i is a child type, i chooses
the B job with a child. In either case, if is beliefs had been correct, then i would have
chosen the A job with a child.
Corollary 4 Assume epi > p for i 2 N . If ui(B; 1) + I < epiui(A; 1) + (1  epi)ui(0; 1) >
ui(A; 0) > pui(A; 1) + (1   p)ui(0; 1), then i chooses the A job with a child no matter what
is type is. If is beliefs had been correct and if i is a child type, then i would have chosen
the B job with a child. If is beliefs had been correct and if i is a career type, then i would
have chosen the A job with no child if ui(A; 0)  I > ui(B; 1), and i would have chosen the
B job with a child if ui(A; 0)  I < ui(B; 1).
Corollaries 3 and 4 follow directly from Proposition 1.
4 Formulation of Beliefs
Next we ask how people formulate beliefs regarding p. Here agents try to learn the correct p,
when the true p is unknown. Let there be an innite number of periods T = f0; 1; 2; :::; t; :::g,
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with new agents born in each period. Each agent lives two periods as before. Agents in
their rst period can observe the outcomes of all agents nishing their last period. Thus,
there are overlapping generations with two generations alive at any given period. At time t,
let the number of agents nishing their second period be nt. At time t = 0, let each agent
i who is in her second period at t = 0 have an initial belief epi0 regarding p. Subsequently, in
period (t  1)  0 each agent i born in (t  1) observes the occupational and child outcomes
of the previous generation at the end of period t   1 and observes the beliefs epit 1 of is
mother and formulates her own belief epit based on these observations. Agent i will hold this
belief epit at the end of (t  1) and in period t when i makes her own occupational and child
choices.
Next we ask how the beliefs epit for t > 0 are formulated. One possibility is that agents
ignore the beliefs of the previous generation epit 1 and simply calculate epit based solely on the
outcomes of the previous generation.
Denition 1 Naive belief formulation: If an agent observes outcomes (A; 1) or (B; 1)
in the previous generation, then she believes the corresponding child is low maintenance.
If an agent observes outcomes (0; 1) or (A; 0), she believes the corresponding child is high
maintenance (or would have been high maintenance).
Let t(j; c) represent the number of agents in their second period having job j and
child outcome c at the end of t, and let t(j; c) represent the number of agents choosing (j; c)
at the beginning of t. Under naive belief formulation, epit = t 1(A;1)+t 1(B;1)nt 1 . If at time t,
every agent in their second period chooses (A; 1), then p percent of these agents end up with
(A; 1) while the remaining (1  p) percent end up with outcome (0; 1). Thus, if nt is large,
then epit+1 = p. But, as the following proposition and example illustrate even if epit+1 = p,
beliefs may not remain at p.
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Proposition 2 Naive belief formulation can cause cycles where beliefs cycle between correct
and incorrect beliefs, and occupational and child choices also cycle.
Proposition 2 is proved true by the following example.
Example 1 Let n be large. At t = 0, let all agents in their second period have beliefs such
that (j; c) = (B; 1) is their best choice. At t = 1, epi1 = 1. If for all i, ui(A; 1)   I <
ui(B; 1), then by Corollary 2 each agent chooses (B; 1) in every period t  1 and epit = 1
for all t  1. If for all i, ui(B; 1) + I < ui(A; 0) > pui(A; 1) + (1   p)ui(0; 1), then by
Corollary 2 all agents choose (A; 1) in period t = 1. Thus epi2 = p. By Proposition 1,
in period 2 career types choose (A; 0) while child types choose (B; 1). Thus epi3 will depend
on the number of career types versus child types in the population. If instead for all i,
ui(A; 0) < pui(A; 1) + (1   p)ui(0; 1) > ui(B; 1) + I, then by Proposition 1 agents choose
(A; 1) in period 2. Thus beliefs and choices remain stable at (A; 1) and epit = p for all t  1.
However, if for all i, ui(A; 1)   I > ui(B; 1), then by Corollary 2 all agents choose
(A; 1) in period t = 1. Thus epi2 = p. If for all i, ui(B; 1) + I > ui(A; 0) > pui(A; 1) +
(1  p)ui(0; 1), then by Proposition 1 in period 2 all agents choose (B; 1). Thus, beliefs and
choices cycle and agents choose (B; 1) and have beliefs epit = p in even periods while in odd
periods agents choose (A; 1) and have beliefs epit = 1.
Next we ask whether or not there exists beliefs which are easy to calculate, but which
have better convergence properties than beliefs formulated naively.
Denition 2 Less naive belief formulation: If agent i observes outcome (A; 1), then she
believes the child is low maintenance. If i observes (0; 1), then she believes the child is high
maintenance. If i observes (B; 1) or (A; 0), then i believes that the probability the child is
low maintenance is epit 1.
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If is mother has beliefs epit 1, then with less naive belief formulationepit = t 1(A;1)+(t 1(B;1)+t 1(A;0))epit 1nt 1 . Without loss of generality, in the remainder of this
section we will refer to agent i and her descendants all as agent i.
Proposition 3 Let agents have beliefs which are formulated less naively and assume every
i 2 N has some initial belief epi0 2 [0; 1]. Then j epit   p jj epit 1   p jj epi0   p j for all t > 0
as n!1.
Proof. If at time t, all agents choose (B; 1) or (A; 0), then epit+1 = epit. It at time t,
some agents choose (A; 1), then at the end of t these agents end up with either (A; 1) or
(0; 1). Thus, if t(A;1)
nt
has positive measure as n!1, then epit+1 = t(A;1)+(t(B;1)+t(A;0))epitnt =
(1  t(A;1)
nt
)epit + (t(A;1)nt )p. If t(A;1)nt does not have positive measure as n!1, then epit+1 =epit. Thus, j epit   p jj epit 1   p jj epi0   p j.
If agents have beliefs which are formulated less naively, then according to Proposition
3, future beliefs cannot diverge further from the true p than initial beliefs do. Thus, the
cycle of beliefs we observed with naive belief formulation is not possible here.
Corollary 5 If epit = p for some t  0, then epit+k = p for all k > 0 as n!1.
This corollary follows directly from Proposition 3 and shows that if at any time agent
i has the correct beliefs, then i keeps the correct beliefs. But as the following example
shows, less naive beliefs can be incorrect.
Example 2 Let epi0 = 0 for all i, but let p = 1 and let ui(A; 0)  I < ui(B; 1) < ui(A; 1)  I.
At time t = 0, all agents (regardless of type) choose (B; 1). Thus, epi1 = 0 and epit = 0 for all
t > 1 and the outcome for all t > 1 is (B; 1). But since p = 1 and ui(B; 1) < ui(A; 1)  I,
the outcome should be all agents choosing (A; 1) in all periods.
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5 Family Networks
Now assume that each agent lives three periods. Let the rst two periods be as before,
but add a third period where an agent continues her job from period 2 and additionally can
perform child care for her grandchild as long as she does not hold an A job in periods 2 and
3. We assume that agent i and all of her descendants have identical preferences and are of
identical types.
Assume that for each agent i, if is mother holds an A job, then investing in education
for an A job costs I < I. Thus, such a mother may have knowledge she can pass on to her
child that makes education less costly; alternatively, such a mother may have accumulated
more wealth which she can use to supplement her childs education. However, such a parent
is unable to help with child care. Assume, that if is mother holds a B job (or no job), then
she can help agent i with child care. Thus, if i has a high maintenance child, then she is
able to keep an A job because her mother can provide supplemental child care.
If i has anA parent and chooses anA job, then is expected payo¤ismaxfui(A; 0); pui(A; 1)+
(1   p)ui(0; 1)g   I. If i has an A parent and chooses a B job, then is expected payo¤ is
ui(B; 1). If i has a B parent and chooses an A job, then is expected payo¤ is ui(A; 1)  I,
while if i chooses a B job, then is expected payo¤ is ui(B; 1).
Proposition 4 (i) If i has a B parent, then i chooses (B; 1) if ui(A; 1)   I < ui(B; 1)
and i chooses (A; 1) if ui(A; 1)   I > ui(B; 1). (ii) If i has an A parent and i is a
career type, then i chooses (A; 0) if ui(A; 0) > pui(A; 1) + (1  p)ui(0; 1) and ui(A; 0)  I >
ui(B; 1): If i is either type, i chooses (A; 1) if ui(A; 0) < pui(A; 1) + (1   p)ui(0; 1) and
pui(A; 1) + (1   p)ui(0; 1)   I > ui(B; 1). And i chooses (B; 1) if i is a career type and
ui(A; 0) > pui(A; 1) + (1   p)ui(0; 1) and ui(A; 0)   I < ui(B; 1) or if i is either type and
ui(A; 0) < pui(A; 1) + (1  p)ui(0; 1) and pui(A; 1) + (1  p)ui(0; 1)  I < ui(B; 1).
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Proposition 4 follows directly from Proposition 1, Corollary 2, and the fact that if i
has a B parent, then i can always keep her job while if i has an A parent then the cost of
investing in education is I < I.
Comparing Proposition 4 to Proposition 1, notice that if i has an A parent, then
the only di¤erence from the two period model is that the cost of investing in education
for the A job has decreased. Thus, if ui(A; 0) > pui(A; 1) + (1   p)ui(0; 1) and i is a
child type, then i chooses (B; 1) in both models. If i is a career type, then she is now
more likely to choose (A; 0) than in the two period model (since I < I and i chooses (A; 0)
if ui(A; 0)   I > ui(B; 1) and chooses (B; 1) if ui(A; 0)   I < ui(B; 1)). If ui(A; 0) <
pui(A; 1) + (1   p)ui(0; 1), then both types are more likely to choose (A; 1) than before
(as i chooses (A; 1) if pui(A; 1) + (1   p)ui(0; 1)   I > ui(B; 1) and i chooses (B; 1) if
pui(A; 1) + (1  p)ui(0; 1)  I < ui(B; 1)). If instead i has a B parent, then i behaves as if
p = 1, and the likelihood of choosing (A; 1) increases.
Next we investigate how is family network inuences the choices of is descendants.
Specically, we are interested in whether or not the choices of is descendants converge to a
single occupational and child choice.
Proposition 5 Let 0 < p < 1 and let n ! 1. If I > ui(A; 1)   ui(B; 1) and if either
ui(A; 0) < pui(A; 1) + (1   p)ui(0; 1) and/or ui(A; 0)   I < ui(B; 1), then the child and
occupational choices of is descendants will converge to (B; 1).
Proof. If is mother has a B job or is unemployed, then since I > ui(A; 1)   ui(B; 1) by
Proposition 4 agent i and similarly all of is descendants will choose (B; 1). If i has an A
parent, then since either ui(A; 0) < pui(A; 1) + (1  p)ui(0; 1) and/or ui(A; 0)  I < ui(B; 1)
by Proposition 4 agent i will never choose (A; 0). Thus i chooses either (B; 1) or (A; 1). If i
chooses (B; 1), then is descendants will continue to choose (B; 1) since I > ui(A; 1) ui(B; 1).
If i chooses (A; 1) and if is outcome is (A; 1), then is child will also choose (A; 1), etc.
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However, each time i or her descendants choose (A; 1) there is a probability (1  p) > 0 that
outcome (0; 1) will occur. Once this occurs, as explained above the rest of is descendants
will choose (B; 1). Since 0 < p < 1 and since n!1 we know that with probability 1 either
i or one or her descendants will have outcome (0; 1).
According to Proposition 5, if the cost of education is high and the utility from the
prestigious job with no child is low, then career and family choices converge to the less
prestigious job with a child. Intuitively, if a woman ever chooses the prestigious job with a
child and experiences a subsequent career separation, then since the cost of education is high
and since she cannot help her daughter nancially, her daughter chooses the less prestigious
job with a child.
Proposition 6 If I < ui(A; 1) ui(B; 1), ui(A; 0) < pui(A; 1)+(1 p)ui(0; 1), and pui(A; 1)+
(1  p)ui(0; 1)  I > ui(B; 1), then i and her descendants all choose (A; 1).
Proof. If i or any of is descendants have a B parent, then by Proposition 4 i chooses (A; 1)
since I < ui(A; 1)   ui(B; 1). For the same reason, if i or any of is descendants have an
unemployed parent, then that agent chooses (A; 1). If i or any of is descendants has an A
parent, then by Proposition 4 that agent will choose (A; 1) since ui(A; 0) < pui(A; 1) + (1 
p)ui(0; 1) and pui(A; 1) + (1  p)ui(0; 1)  I > ui(B; 1).
Here the cost of education is low and the probability of facing a career separation
due to child care is low. Thus even having a parent who loses a job does not deter an agent
from choosing (A; 1) regardless of the type (career or child) that the agent is.
Proposition 7 Assume i and her descendants are career types. If I < ui(A; 1)   ui(B; 1)
and if ui(A; 0) > pui(A; 1) + (1  p)ui(0; 1) and ui(A; 0)  I > ui(B; 1), then either i or one
of her descendants will choose (A; 0) and is descendants end.
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Proof. If i has a B parent or unemployed parent, then by Proposition 4 since I < ui(A; 1) 
ui(B; 1) agent i chooses (A; 1). If i or one of is descendants has an A parent, then by
Proposition 4 that agent chooses (A; 0) since ui(A; 0) > pui(A; 1) + (1   p)ui(0; 1) and
ui(A; 0)  I > ui(B; 1).
Proposition 8 Assume 0 < p < 1. If I < ui(A; 1)   ui(B; 1), ui(A; 0) < pui(A; 1) + (1  
p)ui(0; 1), and pui(A; 1) + (1  p)ui(0; 1)  I < ui(B; 1), then is descendants cycle between
choosing (A; 1) and (B; 1).
Proof. If i or any of her descendants have either a B parent or an unemployed parent,
then by Proposition 4 they choose (A; 1) since I < ui(A; 1)   ui(B; 1). If i or any of her
descendants have an A parent, then by Proposition 4 they choose (B; 1) since ui(A; 0) <
pui(A; 1) + (1  p)ui(0; 1) and pui(A; 1) + (1  p)ui(0; 1)  I < ui(B; 1). Thus, choices will
cycle between (A; 1) and (B; 1) where with probability (1   p) any (A; 1) choice may turn
into outcome (0; 1) prompting this agents child to choose (A; 1). But since 0 < p < 1 some
(A; 1) choices will result in (A; 1) outcomes. Thus, is descendants will never choose just
(A; 1) but will always cycle between (A; 1) and (B; 1).
According to Proposition 8, career and family choices can cycle if the cost of education
is low and the probability of facing a career separation due to child care is high. If the cost
of education is low, then a woman who has a parent with a less prestigious job will choose
the prestigious job with a child since the grandparent can provide child care. And since the
probability of a career separation is high, a woman with a parent with a prestigious job will
choose the less prestigious job with a child, since the grandparent cannot help with child
care.
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6 Concluding Remarks
Womens family and career choices were examined in an environment of uncertainty regarding
the possibility of achieving both a career and family. In addition, we showed that womens
beliefs regarding the probability of a career separation can be updated such that the beliefs
of future generations do not diverge from the true probability of a career separation. Lastly,
we studied the impact of grandparent child care networks on family and career decisions in
both a static and overlapping generations framework.
The model can be extended in various ways. For instance, we assumed that all
women have the same probability of a career separation. Perhaps women have di¤erent
probabilities depending on their specic job. Thus, a woman in a certain law rm may
nd her job more or less conducive to child care than a woman in a di¤erent law rm. So,
the probability of a career separation would be learned by a person observing others at her
rm instead of by observing everyone. Alternatively, perhaps the probability of a career
separation changes over time, thus a more complicated belief updating rule would be needed.
Additionally, we assumed that women with high maintenance children automatically
separate from high-powered careers. Instead, we could allow such women to bargain with
their spouses over how to divide child care. Thus, if a spouse has a less prestigious job,
then perhaps bargaining would lead to the spouse contributing more to child care. Lastly,
one could study the impact of certain public policies such as on site child care or subsidizing
grandparent child care on career and family choices to see if one policy is better than another
at allowing women to obtain both a career and family.
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